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Indian Water Rights, Practical
Reasoning, and Negotiated Settlements
Robert T. Andersont
INTRODUCTION

Indian reserved water rights have a strong legal foundation buttressed by
powerful moral principles. As explained more fully below, the Supreme Court
has implied reserved tribal water rights when construing treaties and other
similar legal instruments. The precise scope and extent of these rights in any
treaty are unknown until quantified by a court ruling or an agreement ratified
by Congress. When litigation is the quantification tool, tribal claims are
generally caught up in massive general-stream adjudications. These
adjudications are massive because to obtain jurisdiction over the Indian water
rights (and over the United States as trustee to the tribes), states must adjudicate
all claims to a given river system; they may not engage in piecemeal litigation
of only the Indian and federal claims. The result can be that there are thousands
of state water rights holders who must be joined as parties to exceedingly
complex litigation that takes too long and costs too much. Moreover, even
when such adjudications are litigated to a conclusion and tribes win a decreed
water right, such a "paper right" may do little to advance tribal needs without
the financial ability or the infrastructure to put the water to use. At the same
time, the general failure of the United States to assert and protect tribal rights
until the 1970s, along with its zealous advancement of competing non-Indian
uses, created expectations among non-Indians that their state-law water rights
were secure. In fact, many non-Indian rights are far from secure.
This Article first reviews the few Indian water rights cases that the U.S.
Supreme Court has decided. The Article then traces a threshold issue common
to Indian water rights litigation in the federal and state courts: how to determine
Copyright 0 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
t Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Native American Law Center, University
of Washington School of Law, Seattle, Washington; Oneida Nation Visiting Professor of Law,
Harvard Law School, 2010-15. Thanks to my friend and colleague, Professor Philip P. Frickey,
for his wonderful scholarship in the field of American Indian law. May his wisdom and kindness
live on in our work and personal lives.
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the purposes of a reservation for which a reserved water right should be
implied. A review of major Indian water rights cases demonstrates the
generally confusing state of the law in significant respects, especially with
regard to the "purposes" determination. This Article posits that the relative
uncertainty in this area has created an environment in which creative, practical
solutions to conflicts have emerged in the Indian water settlements approved by
Congress. This practical approach is consistent with the approach manifested in
the few Supreme Court decisions that reached the merits of Indian water
disputes and fits neatly into the portions of Professor Frickey's scholarship that
call for less litigation and more sovereign-to-sovereign negotiation.' There have
been over two dozen Indian water rights settlements since the 1970s, each
usually preceded by years of litigation. Given the Supreme Court's
abandonment of long accepted substantive and interpretive rules of Indian law,
many tribes now prefer government-to-government negotiations for settling
natural resource disputes to "all or nothing" litigation. Non-Indian water right
claimants also often endorse such an approach since their rights are frequently
suspect not just because of potentially senior tribal rights, but due to infirmities
under state law.
In his 1990 article, CongressionalIntent, Professor Frickey described two
modem camps of scholarly work, neither of which is currently supported by a
majority on the modem Supreme Court. The foundationalist camp
acknowledges federal plenary power over Indian affairs, but couples it with the
principle of continued inherent tribal sovereignty informed by traditional
canons of construction and a federal trust responsibility that are protective of
Indian rights. Under this line of reasoning, tribal treaty rights and powers of
sovereignty over members and territory continue unless Congress explicitly
limits them.2 If followed, this Felix Cohen-like approach would provide
predictability in determining the relative bounds of tribal and state jurisdiction
within Indian country;3 however, for reasons outlined in Frickey's article, the
Court has not followed this approach in a number of recent cases. Since the
1. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, CongressionalIntent, PracticalReasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1206-09 (1990) [hereinafter Frickey,
CongressionalIntent]; Philip P. Frickey, Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Federal Indian Law, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1199 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A
NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1988)).
2. Frickey, CongressionalIntent, supra note 1, at 1206-07.
3. Felix Cohen authored the classic treatise HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (G.P.O.

1945), which is generally credited with bringing some focus and coherence to the field of federal
Indian law. Cohen was a legal realist who read federal law as clearly recognizing Indian tribes as
domestic sovereigns with inherent powers of self-government and free of state authority, but he
also acknowledged comprehensive federal authority over Indian affairs as principally assigned to
Congress pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. While Congress
has such power, Cohen found in the cases the principle that congressional limitations on tribal
power would be found only when Congress had clearly manifested this intent. Further, the federal
trust responsibility to tribes required ambiguities in treaties and statutes to be interpreted in favor
of the Indian nations.
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article's publication in 1990, the Court has continued to resist adopting such an
approach, as demonstrated in a series of tribal losses involving tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers.4 The Court has, however, rendered a few
notable victories for tribal interests and recognized tribal property interests are
protected by the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.5
On the other hand, a camp of critics advocating for rejection of the
plenary power doctrine and increased use of international human rights norms
has not had any influence on the Court to date. This line of scholarship
accurately depicts explicit racism in many of the Court's Indian law decisions
and calls for rejection of many of the fundamental colonial assumptions that
influence federal Indian law.6 While recognizing that the Supreme Court is the
ultimate arbiter of Indian law controversies (subject of course to congressional
override), these critics urge continued confrontation of federal Indian law's
racist and colonial roots as a path to increased protection of tribal sovereignty.
There is little evidence that the modem Court is influenced by this line of
scholarship as it continues to chip away at tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers.
Professor Frickey advanced an approach, distinct from either modern
camp, built upon a "ground up" method of "practical reason." 8 He defined this
approach as a nonformalistic, multi-faceted review of modern context,
historical understanding of legislative motivation, and the evolution of the legal
discourse over time. 9 This approach draws upon canons of construction to assist
the courts in determining the appropriate outcome in cases where treaties and
agreements are silent or ambiguous on a disputed matter,' 0 and recognizes the
importance of contemporary context as important in treaty interpretation.
The most significant problem in litigating Indian water rights is how to
interpret Indian treaties and agreements that rarely, if ever, deal explicitly with
water rights. In 1908, the Supreme Court in Winters v. United States considered
this issue in a way similar to Professor Frickey's "ground up" approach: the
4. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316
(2008); City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005); Atkinson Trading Co. v.
Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Strate v. A-i Contractors,
520 U.S. 438 (1997).
5. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371
(1980).
6. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON, THE REHNQUIST COURT,
INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005).

7. The critics' theory was squarely presented to the Court on behalf of Respondent Hicks
in the briefing in Nevada v. Hicks but did not draw comment from any member of the Court.
Concurring Justices in Hicks and a four-member concurrence/dissent in Plains Commerce Bank
adhered to a foundationalist approach as they argued in favor of tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers.
8. See Frickey, CongressionalIntent, supra note 1,at 1205-08.
9. See id. at 1208.
10. Id. at 1228.
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Court recognized a default rule that water rights are implied when necessary to
fulfill the purposes of an Indian reservation." The Court filled a critical gap in
an agreement between the United States and the Fort Belknap Indian
Community by looking at the agreement in the context of bilateral negotiations,
evaluating the "traditions, preunderstandings, and context" (which are the
primary components of Professor Frickey's practical reasoning), and rejecting
formalist arguments that would have defeated this practical understanding.12
While litigation of Indian water rights persists, there has been a strong
trend favoring congressionally approved Indian water settlements. A multifaceted approach emphasizing "practical reasoning," much like that which
Professor Frickey advocated, has brought about most of these settlements. This
strategy points the way for more progress in the current era of climate change
and changing patterns of water use.
I
INDIAN WATER RIGHTS IN THE SUPREME COURT

Over the past century, the Court has only handed down two substantive
decisions on the nature and scope of Indian reserved water rights (Winters v.
United States'3 and Arizona v. California [Arizona 1] 14), one decision dealing
with Indian allotments (United States v. Powers15 ), two procedural cases

limiting opportunities to bring additional claims (Arizona v. California
[Arizona 1]16 and Nevada v. United States ), and three cases describing the
circumstances under which state courts may adjudicate tribal water rights
without tribal consent (Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States,1 Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,19 and United States v. Idaho20).

The Supreme Court has said precious little directly on the merits, and has
invited state courts to adjudicate federal and tribal reserved rights through its
broad interpretation of the McCarran Amendment.21 At the same time, federal
11. 207 U.S. 564,576-77 (1908).
12. Id. (rejecting an argument that tribal rights were defeated based on the Equal Footing
Doctrine, because "it would be extreme to believe that within a year Congress destroyed the
reservation and took from the Indians the consideration of their grant, leaving them a barren
waste-took from them the means of continuing their old habits, yet did not leave them the power
to change to new ones"); see Frickey, Congressional Intent, supra note 1, at 1232.
13. 207 U.S. 564.
14. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
15. 305 U.S. 527 (1939).
16. 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
17. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
18. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
19. 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
20. 508 U.S. 1 (1993).
21. The McCarran Amendment provides:
Consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the
administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or
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courts may continue to exercise jurisdiction over reserved right claims in the
absence of a state court general stream adjudication or if the state court
22
adjudication has not substantially advanced. Under these circumstances, it is
not surprising that there are many gray areas and some areas of outright conflict
among the approaches of the various state and federal courts.
A. Historic andLegal Context of Indian Water Rights

As mentioned, there is not a great deal of settled law from the U.S.
Supreme Court surrounding many of the important issues that arise in Indian
water rights. Consequently, understanding federal Indian law in the water rights
context requires understanding the few Supreme Court cases dealing with the
merits, the solid trends in lower court decisions, and, most importantly, the past
congressional approaches. In light of these challenges to understanding Indian
water rights, this Section provides a brief context for a discussion of Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the issue, touching on state law, federal government
policy, and two foundational Supreme Court decisions.
All of the western states follow some form of the prior appropriation
doctrine.23 The doctrine generally rewards the first party who physically
removes water from a stream for beneficial use by granting that party a senior
right to divert that amount of water in perpetuity. In periods of shortage, the
date of initial diversion determines priority among competing use rights. 24
Typically, the water appropriator may lose the water-use right by abandonment,
which generally requires proof of intent to no longer use the water. The
appropriator may also lose the right by forfeiture, which is the failure to use the
water for a specified period of time-in common colloquial parlance, "use it or
lose it." In short, states generally require continuous beneficial use of the water
to maintain the right.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the federal
government embarked on a policy of assimilating Indians into the general
is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by
purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such
suit. The United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have
waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is
not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the
judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review
thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United
States in any such suit.
Department of Justice Appropriation Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 82-495, § 208(a), 66 Stat. 549, 560
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006)). See infra text accompanying notes 82-90.
22. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1252 (1984).
23. For a discussion of the basic elements of the doctrine and a list of the eighteen states
that follow the doctrine, see ROBERT E. BECK & AMY K. KELLEY, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS,

§§ 11.01, 12.02 (3d ed. 2009).
24.

Id.
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population with an expectation that traditional modes of life and decision
making would fall by the wayside. 2 5 Establishing reservation homelands as
bases for agricultural economies was one important part of the federal
assimilation policy, and another was the "allotment policy." 26 Prior to the
policy, tribal lands were generally held in common and tribal law and custom
determined individual use rights.27 The new allotment policy authorized the
breakup of tribal lands into individual parcels for distribution among tribal
members in order to encourage agricultural pursuits.28 In general, the United
States would hold in trust for each individual Indian the legal title to each
allotment for a period of time, usually twenty-five years. During the trust
period, state and local governments could not tax the land and the Indian owner
could not alienate it. At the conclusion of the trust period, the Indian would
receive a fee simple patent that he could alienate freely to both Indians and
non-Indians.29
This assimilation policy was largely abandoned in 1934, when Congress
passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). 30 The IRA prohibited further
allotment of Indian reservation land and extended existing restrictions on
alienation of trust land. It was premised on the notion that the assimilation
policy had failed and that the breakup of communal tribal lands into individual
parcels had worsened the economic and social conditions within Indian
32
reservations. However, the federal government had already allotted millions
of acres of tribal land to individual Indians, and non-Indians had acquired many
allotments that had passed from trust status.
Federal promises of permanent homelands were often insufficient to
obtain tribal consent to vast land cessions. Many tribes secured treaty
guarantees of off-reservation hunting and fishing rights. In United States v.
Winans, the Supreme Court considered the rights of Yakama Tribe33 members
25. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.04, at 75-84 (Nell Jessup Newton
et al. eds., 2005 & 2009 Supp.). At the same time, Indians and their lands remained generally
beyond the reach of state law-including state water law. Id. § 6.01[2], at 501-06.
26. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
27. See Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of
Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1559 (2001).

28. The General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, authorized the allotment of tribal
lands without the consent of the affected tribe. Tribal lands within reservations that were not
allotted were often deemed "surplus" and returned to the public domain for disposition under the
federal public land laws. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466-68 (1984) (describing impacts
of allotment and surplus land acts).
29. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 25, §
16.03[2][b], at 1041-42.
30. Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984
(1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (2006)).
31. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461, 462.
32. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 25, § 1.05, at 84-87.
33. The Nation changed the spelling of Yakima to Yakama in 1994 by Resolution T-05394. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, FEDERALLY-RECOGNIZED TRIBES OF THE COLUMBIA-SNAKE

BASIN

7, available at http://stories.washingtonhistory.org/treatytrail/teaching/pdfs/Yakama
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to cross privately owned land in order to exercise off-reservation treaty rights to
fish at usual and accustomed grounds and stations. 34 The confederated tribes of
the Yakama Reservation had ceded most of their land to the United States in
1855 in exchange for exclusive rights to occupy a smaller reservation, along
with "the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common
with citizens of the Territory."35 The private landowners argued that because
their patents from the United States government said nothing about an
easement for access to Indian fishing sites on the now private land, one should
not be implied.
The Court rejected the argument, noting that the treaty reserved rights "to
every individual Indian, as though named therein. They imposed a servitude
upon every piece of land as though described therein." 36 The Court reasoned
that the reserved easement followed from the principle that Indian treaties are
"not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of right from them-a
reservation of those not granted." 3 7 This implied reservation theory quickly ran
up against the state-based rights of non-Indian water users.
B. IndianReserved Water Rights

Indian water rights are rooted in the landmark case of Winters v. United
States, which held that when the federal government set aside land for the Fort
Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana, it impliedly reserved sufficient water
from the Milk River to fulfill its purpose for creating the reservation, which
was to provide a permanent tribal homeland with an agricultural economy. 38
Nonetheless, non-Indians who had settled upstream of the reservation claimed
paramount rights to use water from the Milk River based on the state law of
prior appropriation. If the state law applied, the Fort Belknap Indians would
lose water rights because the reservation's actual use of the river water occuffed later than that of the non-Indian settlers. The Court found, however, that
the Indians' agreements with the federal government impliedly created water
rights for the Indians that trumped the non-Indians' state law water rights. In

Nation.pdf.
34. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). A number of treaties between the United
States and Pacific Northwest tribes used the phrase "usual and accustomed grounds stations." It
simply refers to the locations at which tribal members customarily fished. FAY G. COHEN ET AL.,
TREATIES ON TRIAL 37-38 (1986).

35. Treaty with the Yakamas of 1855, art. III, 12 Stat. 951.
36. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381. The Court found, "[tihe right to resort to the fishing places in
controversy was a part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there
was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not much less necessary to the existence of the
Indians than the atmosphere they breathed." Id.
37. Id.
38. 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). See JOHN SHURTS, INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: THE
Winters DOCTRINE IN ITS SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT, 188os-I930s (2000). For a
comprehensive review of the Indian reserved rights doctrine, see COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 25, § 19.03, at 1174-201.
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Winters, the United States, as trustee to the tribes, sued the non-Indians,
arguing that in 1888 Congress had reserved sufficient water under federal law
to fulfill the purposes for establishing the reservation, which were to encourage
farming by Indians and to serve as a homeland for the tribes. The argument was
simple. If the Indians were to become farmers as contemplated by the
agreement creating the reservation, they would need water being used by nonIndians. The Supreme Court ruled that the federal government had the power to
exempt waters from appropriation under state water law, and that the United
States intended to reserve the waters of the Milk River to fulfill the purposes of
the agreement between the Indians and the United States. 3 9 The Court
accordingly upheld an injunction limiting non-Indian use to the extent it
interfered with the current needs of the tribes.
The ruling in Winters was a departure from the federal government's
usual deference to state water law in the arid West. Moreover, the open-ended
nature of the tribes' reserved water rights became a source of great discontent
among the western states and non-Indian water users, because Indian reserved
rights could effectively get to the front of the line ahead of state water rights.
Thus, state-law appropriators could establish rights relative to one another but
never be certain if an upstream or downstream Indian tribe might have a senior
reserved right, and if so, of its quantity. These users feared that unquantified
Indian reserved rights could someday destroy or undermine their investments in
infrastructure to use the water under state law. 4 0 Some early to mid twentieth
century cases in lower federal courts also recognized implied Indian reserved
water rights but similarly did not quantify the amount reserved with any
finality. 4 1 While Winters set out the basic parameters of the Indian reserved
water rights doctrine, there have been few other Supreme Court cases dealing
with the nature of the rights. And aside from the modern Indian water rights
42
settlements, Congress has not spoken to the substance of Indian water rights.
The situation in Winters is typically described as a case where the United
States reserved the water through Congress's establishment of the Fort Belknap

39. 207 U.S. at 576-77; see generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,
supra note 25, § 19.02, at 1171-73.
40. There was in fact little interference with state law rights due to the general lack of
development of Indian water rights on the ground. The National Water Commission in 1973
concluded that "[i]n the history of the United States Government's treatment of Indian tribes, its
failure to protect Indian water rights for use on the reservations it set aside for them is one of the
sorrier chapters." NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE - FINAL REPORT TO

THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 475 (G.P.O. 1973); see also Robert
T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights and the FederalTrust Responsibility, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J.

399 (2006).
41. See Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908); United States v.
Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957). The
Ninth Circuit in both cases recognized reserved rights that could increase as tribal needs
expanded.
42. See appendix for a list of all such settlements.
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Reservation. There is, however, language in Winters indicating that it was
instead the tribe that did the reserving.43 Recall that under the Winans rationale,
courts need not look to congressional action conferringwater rights on a tribe if
the tribe was the original owner of an area. Instead, the Winans inquiry looks to
whether the tribe surrendered such rights by treaty or through other
congressional action." In most modem cases, however, and as the Supreme
Court found in both Winters and Arizona I, the question is whether a
reservation of water should be implied from congressional action to fulfill the
purposes of the reservation.45
Furthermore, Winters exemplified how the Indian law canons of
construction may serve as important tiebreakers between a conflict of
implications. 46 If one were to take a formalist approach after Winans, one could
forcefully argue that because there was no explicit surrender of water on the
reservation, the tribes continued to own it all. The courts have instead
determined ownership of water rights in a fashion that takes into account at
some level the background principles of state water law, the expectations of the
parties when the relevant treaty was negotiated, and and modem circumstances
of the parties. In short, courts appear to be engaged in "practical reasoning."
The Supreme Court's next Indian reserved water rights case examined a
provision of the allotment legislation. In United States v. Powers, the Court
43. "The Indians had command of the lands and the waters-command of all their
beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, 'and grazing roving herds of stock,' or turned to
agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give up all this?" Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564, 576 (1908). In its brief to the Court, the United States stated that the Indians retained or
were granted by the United States the right to divert and use for domestic, irrigation, and other
beneficial purposes the amount of Milk River waters sufficient to meet their needs and carry out
the objects of their agreement. Brief for the United States at 12, Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564 (1908) (No. 158); see BECK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 23, at § 37.01(b)(2)
(noting the ambiguity); see also Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism,and Interpretation in FederalIndian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 402 (1993)
[hereinafter Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present] (noting the roots of Winans and Winters in

Chief Justice Marshall's recognition of retained tribal sovereignty in Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)). The Court may have glossed over this point because in Winters, and in
most Indian water rights cases, a priority date as of the date of the federal action setting aside land
will be sufficiently early to precede any competing state rights.
44. Any surrender of such rights must be clear and express. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 25, § 2.02[1], at 120 ("[T]ribal property rights and sovereignty

are preserved unless Congress's intent to the contrary is clear and unambiguous.").
45. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 567, 577-78 (1908); Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 599 (1963). See supra note 43 for a possible reason that the Winans rationale is often
ignored.
46. By a rule of interpretation of agreements and treaties with the Indians, ambiguities
occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians. And the rule should
certainly be applied to determine between two inferences, one of which would support
the purpose of the agreement and the other impair or defeat it. On account of their
relations to the Government, it cannot be supposed that the Indians were alert to
exclude by formal words every inference which might militate against or defeat the
declared purpose of themselves and the Government ....
Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
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addressed whether non-Indian successors to allotment owners acquired any
right to use a portion of the water right originally reserved by a tribe under the
Winters doctrine.47 The United States allotted the Crow Reservation early in the
twentieth century and developed an irrigation project to serve approximately
20,000 acres of reservation land-including some allotments-but not all
reservation lands and allotments. The federal government argued that because
the allotments at issue (which non-Indians had acquired) were not included
within the original irrigation project area, the non-Indian owners had not gained
any reserved water right and thus should be enjoined from taking water from
the Little Big Horn River and Lodge Grass Creek. In other words, the
government claimed that the Secretary of the Interior had effectively allocated
the water in the Little Big Horn River and Lodge Grass Creek to the exclusion
of the allotments that were served by upstream diversions-including the
former allotments now held by the non-Indian parties. The Court rejected the
government's arguments, stating that "when allotments of land were duly made
for exclusive use [of individual tribal citizens] and thereafter conveyed in fee,
the right to use some portion of tribal waters essential for cultivation passed to
the [new] owners."Ai Because the issue was not properly framed, the Court did
"not consider the extent or precise nature of respondents' rights in the
waters." 4 9 While the Court denied the federal government's requested
injunction, language in the opinion indicates that the allotments and the nonIndian successors could have been limited, but only by the development of
"rules and regulations" under the Dawes Act, 25 U.S.C. § 381 (2006).so
The Supreme Court did not revisit the Indian reserved rights doctrine until
1963, when it rendered a one-hundred-page decision in Arizona v. California
(Arizona 1), a case dealing primarily with the division of the water in the
Colorado River among the affected upper and lower basin states.5' The United
States intervened on behalf of several Colorado River Indian tribes and asserted
claims for full and permanent allocations of water rights to the tribes.52 The
claims went a step beyond the ruling of Winters, which had resulted in an
injunction against certain uses, but had left the tribes with an indeterminate
right and an open-ended decree. The Supreme Court agreed with the United
States that a final quantification was desirable and endorsed the practicably

47. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939). For background on the allotment
legislation, see supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
48. Id. at 532.
49. Id. at 533.
50. Id. at 530. This issue has vexed the Department of the Interior ever since. See, e.g.,
Entitlements to Water Under the Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act, Sol. Op. M36982 (Mar. 30, 1995).
51. Arizona v. California (Arizona 1), 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
52. The tribes were the Colorado River Indian Tribes, Fort Mojave Indian Tribe,
Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, Cocopah Indian Tribe, and Fort Yuma (Quechan) Indian Tribe. Id. at
595 n.97.
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irrigable acreage (PIA) doctrine, which allowed a quantification of reserved
water rights for the present and future needs of the several Indian reservations.
In general, the PIA test awards water for present and historical irrigation, for
those tribal lands capable of sustaining irrigation in the future, and for growing
crops in an economically feasible manner. 54 The Arizona I Court concurred
with the position the United States urged before the Special Master.
We also agree with the Master's conclusion as to the quantity of water
intended to be reserved. He found that the water was intended to
satisfy the future as well as the present needs of the Indian
Reservations and ruled that enough water was reserved to irrigate all
the practicably irrigable acreage on the reservations. Arizona, on the
other hand, contends that the quantity of water reserved should be
measured by the Indians' "reasonably foreseeable needs," which, in
fact, means by the number of Indians. How many Indians there will be
and what their future needs will be can only be guessed. We have
concluded, as did the Master, that the only feasible and fair way by
which reserved water for the reservations can be measured is irrigable
acreage. 55
The Court explained its agreement with the Special Master by noting a number
of practical factors, such as the establishment of reservations in areas where
water was essential to allow the Indians to survive, and by emphasizing fairness
and feasibility as justifications for reliance on irrigable acreage as the
measure. 56 The Court could have simply followed the Winters rule and
provided for current use, subject to future expansion as the Indians' needs
increased. In the context of a division of the waters of the Colorado River
among the various states, however, it would have made no sense to leave
potentially large claims unquantified. Thus, instead of following a formal rule,
the Court engaged in practical reasoning in order to provide a final resolution
of the water rights controversy before it. In so doing, however, it continued the
mode of analysis used by the Court in Winters nearly fifty years earlierinterpreting the legal instruments establishing the various reservations broadly
to fulfill the purpose of creating permanent tribal homelands with agricultural
economies. At the same time, the Court approved the use of agricultural water

53.

Id. at 600-01.

See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 25, at § 19.03[5], at
1184-88.
55. 373 U.S. at 600-01. The Court referred to Special Master Simon H. Rifkind's
conclusions on pages 264-65 of his report ("Rifkind Report") to the Supreme Court in Arizona I.
The report is available at Western Waters Digital Libraries, http://www.westernwaters.org (search
for "Rifkind") and at the Colorado River Central Arizona Project Collection, Arizona State
University, http://digital.lib.asu.edu/cdm4/browse.php (search for "Rifkind"). See also Note, The
54.

Irrigable Acres Doctrine, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 375 (1975) (describing alternative proposals to

measure Indian water rights for present and future needs). For a discussion of the PIA standard,
see COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 25, §19.03[5][b], at 1185-86.
56. Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 599-600.
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for other purposes as time and the desires of the tribes changed.
The only other case to reach the Court on the merits, besides Arizona I,
was

Wyoming v.

United States, which

involved Wyoming's

general

adjudication of water rights to the Big Horn River, including the rights of the
Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes. 58 Although the Court granted review to
consider the Wyoming Supreme Court's application of the PIA standard, there
was no Opinion for the equally divided Court. Part II considers this case, along
with other lower court decisions.
C. Non-Indian Reserved Rights

In a development that would later have far-reaching repercussions for
Indian reserved rights, the Arizona I Court also applied the reserved rights
doctrine to land set aside as federal reservations for non-Indian purposes.59
While the amount of water awarded for the non-Indian federal reservations was
relatively insignificant, 60 the Master had "ruled that the principle underlying the
reservation of water rights for Indian Reservations was equally applicable to
other federal establishments such as National Recreation Areas and National
Forests
and the Supreme Court agreed that "the United States intended to
reserve water sufficient for the future requirements of the Lake Mead National
Recreation Area, the Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge, the Imperial
National Wildlife Refuge and the Gila National Forest." 62
The Court took up the question of non-Indian federal reserved water rights
again, thirteen years later, in Cappaert v. United States,63 which involved the
federal government's claim that groundwater pumping conducted in accordance
with state law unlawfully interfered with water rights reserved by the United
States for the protection of the desert pupfish. The district court had enjoined
non-Indian groundwater pumpers located over two miles from an underground
pool from depleting the aquifer below a point that would endanger survival of
the fish.64 On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the district court decision,
concluding that the establishment of Devil's Hole National Monument carried
with it an implied reservation "in unappropriated water which vests on the date
57. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419, 422-23 (1979) (supplemental decree).
58. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) (per curiam), affg by an equally
divided Court In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Syst., 753
P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988).
59.

The Court held in Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955), that the

Desert Land Act, which generally authorized the application of state water law to grantees of
federal land, did not apply to water rights on federally reserved land.
60. See Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1964) (decree).
61. Arizona v. California (Arizona 1), 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). For a review of the
evolution of the doctrine, see John D. Leshy, Water Rights for New Federal Land Conservation
Programs: A Turn-of-the-Century Evaluation, 4 U. DENv. WATER L. REV. 271, 288 (2001).

62.
63.
64.

Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 601.
426 U.S. 128 (1976).
Id. at 133, 136.
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of the reservation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators."65
Because Congress established the Monument for the singular purpose of
protecting the desert pupfish fish and its habitat, it followed naturally,
according to the Court, that Congress intended to reserve water to fulfill the
purpose of the Monument. The Court cited Winters to reject the notion that the
reserved rights doctrine called for a balancing of interests between state law
water users and the federal water rights.66 Further, the Court described the
district court's injunction as tailored to the "minimal need" required to protect
the pool and thus the pupfish. While this language appeared to be more
descriptive of what was done by the lower court, it took on a life of its own in
the next federal reserved water rights case before the Court.
In United States v. New Mexico,68 the Court signaled a shift in its
treatment of non-Indian reserved rights when it narrowly construed reserved
water rights for national forests by making it clear that such rights would only
be implied where needed to fulfill the "primary purposes" of the reservation
and only if the primary purposes would be "entirely defeated" without an
implied reservation of water. It accordingly held that water was reserved in
national forests for dual primary purposes: "to preserve the timber or to secure
favorable water flows for private and public uses under state law.",70 The Court
conveyed a sense of hostility toward non-Indian federal reserved rights when it
noted that in the case of fully appropriated rivers, "federal reserved water rights
will frequently require a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the amount of water
available for water-needy state and private appropriators." 7 Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the Court stated, "[e]ach time this Court has applied the 'impliedreservation-of-water doctrine,' it has carefully examined both the asserted
water right and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved, and
concluded that without the water the purposes of the reservation would be
entirely defeated." 72 The statement was hardly true; for example, Arizona I
devoted but two sentences to non-Indian federal reserved rights issues for five
different federal reservations. 73 Nevertheless, the cautionary language in
65.
66.
67.

Id at 138.
Id. at 138-39.
Id. at 141.

68. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
69. Id. at 700. In the associated footnote, the Court cited to Winters, noting that "[w]ithout
water to irrigate the lands, however, the Fort Belknap Reservation would be 'practically valueless'
and 'civilized communities could not be established thereon.' The purpose of the Reservation
would thus be "'impair[ed] or defeat[ed]."' Id. at 700 n.4 (internal citation omitted).
70. Id at 718.
71. Id. at 705; see 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINs & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 5:36 (Thomson/West 2007) (providing a comprehensive review of

federal reserved water rights litigation after United States v. New Mexico).
72. 438 U.S. at 700.
73. Cappaertcontributes little to Justice Rehnquist's argument, because the Proclamation
on its face reserved the pool for the pupfish, and the limiting "minimal need" language was simply
a quotation from the district court's opinion.
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Cappaertand New Mexico regarding non-Indian federal reserved rights opened
the door for some courts to construe narrowly Indian reserved rights as well.74
Before reviewing the substantive application of the doctrine, however, it is
necessary to review a series of important cases dealing with state court
jurisdiction.
D. Reopening Decrees and TribalIntervention

The Court's later cases have been largely procedural, but extremely
significant, and the Court's several rulings in favor of state court jurisdiction
are consistent with the negative attitude the Court expressed toward non-Indian
federal reserved rights in United States v. New Mexico. Indian tribes, on the
other hand, have generally viewed state court jurisdiction as inconsistent with
fundamental notions of tribal sovereignty and the historic tribal immunity from
state law. The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the McCarran
Amendment (discussed in Part I.E, below) permitting jurisdiction over tribal
claims is generally viewed as inconsistent with countervailing Indian law
principles limiting state court jurisdiction over Indian tribes and their property
in the absence of express delegation of such authority to the states.
In 1983, the Court reemphasized the importance of finality in water rights
litigation when it rejected claims by the United States and tribes to reopen the
1963 Arizona I decree in order to seek water for lands omitted from the 1963
claims.75 In rejecting the effort, the Court explained that "[a] major purpose of
this litigation, from its inception to the present day, has been to provide the
necessary assurance to States of the Southwest and to various private interests,
of the amount of water they can anticipate to receive from the Colorado River
system." The Court also noted, "[t]he standard for quantifying the reserved
water rights [in Arizona I] was also hotly contested by the States, who argued
that the Master adopted a much too liberal measure." 77 The Court cautioned
that reopening the decree to allow claims might also allow the states to pursue
arguments that the quantified tribal share should be circumscribed.
Significantly, the Court recognized the right of the tribes to intervene in
the case to assert their own rights and not depend solely on the United States'
representation of them as trustee. The States had argued that tribal intervention
was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. The Court rejected
the States' argument in one of the few positive rulings for tribes since 1963:
74.
75.

See infra text accompanying notes 97-98.
Arizona v. California (Arizona II), 460 U.S. 605 (1983).

76.

Id. at 620.

77. Id. at 617 (citation omitted). In the latest iteration of this case, the Supreme Court held
that the Quechan tribe of the Fort Yuma Reservation could assert additional claims for lands
within reservations with disputed boundaries at the time of the 1963 proceeding. Arizona v.
California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000). The Court approved a final settlement of these claims in 2006
and thus ended this long-running litigation. Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150 (2006).
78. Arizona II, 460 U.S. at 617.
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The Tribes do not seek to bring new claims or issues against the States,
but only ask leave to participate in an adjudication of their vital water
rights that was commenced by the United States. Therefore, our
judicial power over the controversy is not enlarged by granting leave
to intervene, and the States' sovereign immunity protected by the
Eleventh Amendment is not compromised. See, e.g., Maryland v.
Louisiana,451 U.S. 725, 745, n. 21 (1981).79
This ruling cleared the way for direct tribal participation in the many general
stream adjudications commenced throughout the West.
The importance of tribal intervention was made apparent by the ruling in
Nevada v. United States less than two months later, when the United States'
failure to assert all tribal claims in an adjudication precluded a later attempt to
assert those claims. The Nevada Court rejected efforts by the United States and
the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe to reopen the Orr Ditch decree of 1946 in which
the federal government had failed to assert all tribal claims.s0 Despite the
existence of a clear conflict of interest on the part of the United States, the
Court held that principles of res judicata precluded both the Tribe and the
United States from asserting a claim for water for tribal fisheries. t8
Consequently, most tribes now intervene in state general stream adjudications
to ensure that all their reserved water right claims are presented and not just
those that the U.S. Department of Justice deems merit worthy.
E. Interpretationof the McCarranAmendment

Another group of Supreme Court cases involving federal Indian reserved
rights interpreted the McCarran Amendment.82 In these cases, the Court read
the Amendment broadly to provide states with authority to adjudicate federal
water rights.83 The Court also held that the Amendment requires that the
adjudications be comprehensive-inclusive of the rights of all owners on a
given stream-for a state court to assert jurisdiction over federal claims. 84
79.

Id. at 614.

80.

Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).

8 1. Id. at 142-44; see also Ann C. Juliano, ConflictedJustice: The DepartmentofJustice's
Conflict of Interest in Representing Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REV. 1307, 1341-55

(2003) (discussing the Nevada opinion).
82. See supra note 21.
83. See, e.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). For a comprehensive pre- and postenactment history of the amendment, see John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A
Century ofAdjudicating Rivers and Streams, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 355 (2005) [hereinafter
Thorson, Dividing Western Waters] and John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A
Century of Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, Part II, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 299 (2006)
[hereinafter Thorson, Dividing Western Waters, Part Il].

84. In dismissing the claims in Dugan, the Court noted:
that the United States may be joined in suits "for the adjudication of rights to the use of
water of a river system or other source," is not applicable here. Rather than a case
involving a general adjudication of "all of the rights of various owners on a given
stream," S. Rep. No. 755, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1951), it is a private suit to determine

water rights solely between the respondents and the United States and the local
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Although the statute on its face says nothing about state court authority to
adjudicate federal reserved rights, or Indian reserved water rights,85 the Court
interpreted the McCarran Amendment to allow states to assert jurisdiction over
both federal86 and Indian reserved water rights. Even states that had
disclaimed jurisdiction over Indian lands in enabling acts as a condition for
their entry into the Union could now assert jurisdiction over reserved water
rights under the Amendment. And while tribal sovereign immunity stood as a
separate bar to joining tribes without their consent, tribes would now be bound
by any decree in which the United States as trustee was properly brought into a
general stream adjudication.89 In its latest word on the joinder of the United
States, and thereby on tribal rights, the Court cautioned the following:
State courts, as much as federal courts, have a solemn obligation to
follow federal law. Moreover, any state-court decision alleged to
abridge Indian water rights protected by federal law can expect to
receive, if brought for review before this Court, a particularized and
exacting scrutiny commensurate with the powerful federal interest in
safeguarding those rights from state encroachment. 90
II
INDIAN RESERVED RIGHTS IN THE LOWER COURTS

Given the Court's endorsement of the PIA doctrine in Arizona I, it was not
surprising that the doctrine would be the centerpiece of the substantive law for
the measure of Indian water rights in Wyoming v. United States.9 1 In the
Wyoming Supreme Court, the parties had agreed that PIA consisted of "those
acres susceptible to sustained irrigation at reasonable costs." 92 The Wyoming
Reclamation Bureau officials.
372 U.S. at 618.
85. General rules of Indian law preclude the exercise of state regulatory or adjudicatory
jurisdiction over Indian tribes, their members and their property within Indian country. See
generally COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 25,

§ 6.01,

at 499-514.

86. See United States v. Dist. Court (Eagle County), 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
87. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The
Colorado River Court also held that while the Amendment does not deprive federal courts of
jurisdiction over Indian water rights cases, they should abstain from asserting jurisdiction over
water rights disputes when a state is asserting jurisdiction over the same matter. Id. at 819-21; see
also United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1 (1993) (holding that the McCarran Amendment waiver
does not permit States to require federal government to pay exorbitant state court filing fees).
88. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
89. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 135 (1983).
90.
91.

San CarlosApache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 571.
Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989), af'g by an equally divided Court In

re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Syst., 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo.
1988). See supra text accompanying note 58. According to the United States' Brief to the Court,
as of 1990, the PIA standard was a central component in more than a dozen water Indian rights
cases in the western states. Brief for the United States at 49 n.46, Wyoming v. United States, 492
U.S. 406 (No. 88-309).
92. Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Supreme Court recognized a substantial reserved right for the tribes, 93 and the
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision in a 4-4 vote. 94 In his brief to the
Supreme Court in Wyoming, the Solicitor General pointed out that "the PIA
standard has generated significant expectations, reliance, and investment, both
legal and financial. For example, it forms the basis of proof in ongoing
litigation, or is the cornerstone of current settlement negotiations, in virtually
all western water rights quantifications."95 There has been no further word from
the Court on the substance of the quantification of Indian reserved water rights,
although a draft opinion for the Court by Justice O'Connor before her recusal
advocated change in administration of the PIA standard. 96
The critical determination in any Indian reserved water rights case, and
the area of greatest disagreement among the lower courts, is the determination
of the purposes of an Indian reservation.
The Court's intervening decisions regarding non-Indian federal reserved
rights, especially United States v. New Mexico, 97 have affected the analysis due
to then-Justice Rehnquist's emphasis on the historical primacy of state water
law and his observation that the federal reserved rights doctrine "is [treated as]
an exception to Congress' explicit deference to state water law in other
areas."98 As noted in the leading Indian law treatise, results have been mixed,
93. The court recognized about 290,000 acre feet of water for historic and current irrigation
and 210,000 acre feet for future irrigation of lands never irrigated. It applied the PIA analysis to
both classes of lands. Id. at 101-09. In its petition for review, the State of Wyoming described the
State Supreme Court's holding:
A closely divided Wyoming Supreme Court (3-2) affirmed the judgment of the district
court, except for (1) an increase of 21,000 acre-feet in the amount of the 1868 reserved
water right based on the future projects, reversing a 10% reduction recommended by
the Master and adopted by the district court and increasing the total award to 500,420
acre feet.
Petition for Certiorari at 9, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (No. 88-309). The United
States responded in its merits brief:
The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed most of the district court's rulings and awarded
the Tribes 500, 717 acre-feet per year based strictly on agricultural use. In each
instance, the Wyoming courts determined the Tribes' reserved water rights for
agricultural use through the application of the 'practicably irrigable acreage' (PIA)
standard-the same standard that this Court employed in [Arizona f]. Wyoming, which
initially argued that if a reserved water right exists, it should be quantified through the
PIA standard, now thinks that this was a mistake.
Brief for the United States, supra note 91, at 2-3 (citation omitted).
94. See Wyoming, 492 U.S. at 407.
95. Brief for the United States, supra note 91, at 48-49 (citations omitted).
96.

See Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions

in Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. CoLo. L. REv. 683 (1997); David H. Getches, Conquering
the CulturalFrontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L.

REV. 1573, 1640-41 (1996).
97. 438 U.S. 696 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
98. 438 U.S. at 715. Even Justice Powell's partial dissent-joined by three others-began
by stating, "I agree with the Court that the implied-reservation doctrine should be applied with
sensitivity to its impact upon those who have obtained water rights under state law and to
Congress' general policy of deference to state water law." Id. at 718 (Powell, J., dissenting in
part); cf Mergen & Liu, supra note 96 (criticizing proposed "sensitivity analysis" as inconsistent
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with some lower courts, such as the Arizona Supreme Court, rejecting
application of the New Mexico test to the Indian reserved rights context, but
looking to it for guidance. Other courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, have stated
that they would apply the test, but did so in a generous fashion given the Indian
law canons of construction, while the Wyoming Supreme Court applied New
Mexico to limit strictly the purposes for which water was reserved.99
A. Ninth CircuitPrecedent

In litigation involving the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, the Ninth Circuit found reserved rights to water for both
agricultural and fisheries purposes. 00 The court stated:
We apply the New Mexico test here. The specific purposes of an Indian
reservation, however, were often unarticulated. The general purpose, to
provide a home for the Indians, is a broad one and must be liberally
construed. We are mindful that the reservation was created for the
Indians, not for the benefit of the government. 01
After concluding that the reservation, like most in the West, had been set aside
for agricultural purposes, the court supplemented its award of water under the
PIA standard with water for instream flows to support tribal fisheries, due to
the tribe's demonstrated traditional reliance on fisheries resources.102
with Supreme Court precedent and detrimental to atmosphere in which Indian water rights
settlements have flourished).
99.
See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 25, § 19.03[4][5][a], at 1181-85 (citing cases); see also WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A

NUTSHELL 379-84 (5th ed. 2009). Although Judge Canby's work is part of the nutshell series, it
has received glowing reviews in earlier editions that remain applicable. See, e.g., Frickey,
Scholarship, Pedagogy, and FederalIndian Law, supra note 1.

100. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47-49 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). The Executive Order creating the reservation provided: "It is
hereby ordered that the country . .. bounded on the east and south by the Columbia River, on the
west by the Okanogan River, and on the north by the British possessions, be, and the same is
hereby, set apart as a reservation for said Indians, and for such other Indians as the Department of
the Interior may see fit to locate thereon." Executive Order of July 2, 1872, reprintedin I Kappler,
Indian Affairs and Treaties, 916 (2d ed. 1904).
101.

Colville Confederated Tribes, 647 F.2d at 47 (citations omitted).

102. Id at 48. The court also stated that "Congress envisioned agricultural pursuits as only
a first step in the 'civilizing' process" and that "[t]his vision of progress implies a flexibility of
purpose." Id at 47 n.9 (citing 11 Cong. Rec. 905 (1881)). For a state court following a similar
approach, see State Department of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation IrrigationDistrict, 850 P.2d

1306 (Wash. 1993) (en banc):
A right to water may be reserved for any primary purpose of the reservation and there
may be more than one such purpose.
The "controlling" purpose of the treaty was to "make possible the permanent settlement
of the Yakima Indians and their transformation into an agricultural people." . . . All of
the parties to this litigation agree that the Yakima Indians are entitled to water for
irrigation purposes and, at least at one time, were entitled to water for the preservation
of fishing rights. The disagreement here is the extent of the treaty rights remaining.
Id. at 1316-17 (citations omitted).
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Application of the narrow New Mexico standard for non-Indian federal
reservations seems wrong.' 03 While it may be appropriate to limit implied
reserved water rights when construing federal actions establishing federal
reservations, the instruments creating Indian reservations are governed by
canons of construction that require ambiguities to be interpreted in favor of the
Indians. Moreover, the Indian tribes were preexisting owners of the lands
reserved for their permanent use and occupancy. As such, the notion that they
reserved all rights except those explicitly ceded to the United States argues for
a broad interpretation of Indian reserved rights as opposed to non-Indian
federal reserved rights.104
Similarly, in United States v. Adair, the Ninth Circuit considered claims
by the United States and the Klamath Tribes to water for instream flows and
lake levels to protect treaty rights to fish, wildlife, and plants.105 The court
applied the Winans rationale in evaluating the Klamath Tribe's water rights:
"[T]he 1864 Treaty [with the Klamaths] is a recognition of the Tribe's
aboriginal water rights and a confirmation to the Tribe of a continued water
right to support its hunting and fishing lifestyle on the Klamath Reservation."
Such water rights necessarily carry a priority date of time immemorial. The
rights were not created by the 1864 Treaty, rather, the treaty confirmed the
continued existence of these rights.106
The Klamath Tribes also claimed reserved water to provide irrigation for
individual Indians who had received allotments of tribal land. The court stated
"New Mexico and Cappaert,while not directly applicable to Winters doctrine
rights on Indian reservations . . . establish several useful guidelines."' 0 7 The
court explained, "[w]hile the purpose for which the federal government
reserves other types of lands may be strictly construed . . . the purposes of

Indian reservations are necessarily entitled to broader interpretation if the goal
of Indian self-sufficiency is to be attained." 08 Other lower courts have taken
different, and inconsistent approaches to evaluating the purposes of Indian
reservations.
B. Inconsistency Among State Courts

The decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court and the Wyoming Supreme
Court present an interesting contrast to the Ninth Circuit's approach. In the
general stream adjudication of the Gila River, the Arizona Supreme Court
endorsed a "homeland" approach that has superficial appeal in its interpretive
103. See supra text accompanying note 99.
104. See supra discussion at notes 34-37.
105. 723 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
106. Id. at 1414. (citing Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 678-81 (1979)).
107. Id. at 1408 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 1408 n.13 (quoting WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 245-46 (1981)).
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analysis that looks to the general purpose behind the treaty.109 The court
concluded that the essential purpose of Indian reservations is to provide Indian
tribes with a permanent home and abiding place that is a "livable" environment,
but expressed concern that awarding "too much water" under the PIA analysis
to tribes would be inconsistent with the "minimal need" approach it borrowed
from the non-Indian federal reserved water cases.110 The answer to this, of
course, is that once a federal reserved water right is recognized under a PIA or
any other consumptive use standard, the water may be marketed to other users
or used for other purposes by the tribe. Relegating the PIA measure to a
matter merely for consideration as part of a total award focused on "minimal
need" seems to invite trial courts to balance Indian reserved rights against nonIndian uses to avoid adverse effects on state water rights-an approach rejected
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cappaert.l12 Leading commentators also share
pessimism regarding the fairness of the Arizona approach, but it remains to be
seen whether it will ever be implemented." 3
On the other hand, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in the Big Horn case,
adhered strictly to the PIA standard and rejected claims for other uses such as
109. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source,
35 P.3d 68, 74, 77-79 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc).
110. Id. at 78 ("Another concern with PIA is that it forces tribes to pretend to be farmers in
an era when 'large agricultural projects ... are risky, marginal enterprises."'). It is doubtful that a
tribe would undertake an agricultural operation if it would not at least break even financially (as
required to demonstrate PIA), thus obviating the Arizona Supreme Court's concern that a tribe
would somehow be "forced" into an uneconomic activity, or to "pretend to be farmers."
11l. The only relevant U.S. Supreme Court decision permitted a change in use of
agricultural water to other uses. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419, 422 (1979) (approving
agreement quantifying rights and recognizing potential for non-agricultural uses); see also Rifkrind
Report, supra note 55, at 265-66; CANBY, supra note 99, at 481; cf In re Gen. Adjudication of All
Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 835 P.2d 273, 279 (Wyo. 1992) (change in use
not permitted).
112. The Arizona Supreme. Court stated:
The PIA standard also potentially frustrates the requirement that federally
reserved water rights be tailored to minimal need. Rather than focusing on what is
necessary to fulfill a reservation's overall design, PIA awards what may be an
overabundance of water by including every irrigable acre of land in the equation.
The court's function is to determine the amount of water necessary to effectuate this
[homeland] purpose, tailored to the reservation's minimal need. We believe that such a
minimalist approach demonstrates appropriate sensitivity and consideration of existing
users' water rights, and at the same time provides a realistic basis for measuring tribal
entitlements.
Gila River, 35 P.3d at 79, 81. See supra text accompanying note 69 for the relevant discussion of
Cappaert.

113. CANBY, supra note 99, at 480 ("The fact that [the Arizona Supreme Court's] formula
is likely to lead to a lower award to the tribes is suggested by the fact that they and the United
States urged adherence to the standard of practicably irrigable acreage."); COHEN's HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 25, § 19.03[5][b], at 1187 ("Although the Arizona court's
approach avoids the problems inherent in PIA, its focus on minimal needs may ultimately leave

some tribes with less water than the imperfect PIA standard."). In 2004, the claims of several
Arizona tribes were settled. Arizona Water Settlements Act, Pub. L. No. 108-451, 118 Stat. 3478
(2004) (Gila River, Tohono O'odham, San Carlos).
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instream flows for fisheries or mineral and industrial development.1 14 However,
the court's approach is plainly incorrect in that it ignores the Indian law canons
of construction and thus narrowly construes the purposes of a reservation.115
While the court did find that other uses such as municipal, domestic and
commercial uses were subsumed within the agricultural right,' 1 6 the court later
compounded its error in narrowly construing the treaty by refusing to permit
the tribe to change the use of a portion of its agricultural water to instream
flows to enhance fisheries habitat.l17
III
INDIAN WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENTS

Despite the hundreds of treaties establishing, enlarging, and diminishing
Indian land reservations, which rarely mention water, Congress as a general
matter has said even less than the Supreme Court on the subject of Indian
reserved water rights. The Dawes Act of 1887 provides the Secretary of the
Interior with authority to make an equitable distribution of water for irrigation
purposes to allottees on reservations."' 8 The McCarran Amendment of 1952
says nothing explicitly about federal or Indian reserved water rights. However,
Congress has enacted twenty-three modem Indian water rights settlement
statutes, ratifying federal-state-tribal agreements.
Although there was little development of water resources for tribes in the
aftermath of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Winters v. United
States,"19 an increase in litigation involving both the McCarran Amendment
and potential threats to extant non-Indian uses led to the settlement of a number
of Indian water rights controversies in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries. Since 1978, Congress has approved twenty-three Indian water rights
settlements;1 20 two other agreements were not subject to congressional
114. See, e.g., In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 98-99 (Wyo. 1988) (applying primary purpose test strictly), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
115.

See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 25,

§

19.03[4], at

1183.
116. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753
P.2d 76, 99 (Wyo. 1988).
117. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 835
P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992). There was no single opinion explaining the court's rationale.
118. See supra text accompanying note 50.
119. See 207 U.S. 564 (1908); see also NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 40; Anderson,
supra note 40.
120. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 25, § 19, at 1212

n.327. In addition to the settlements cited in COHEN, Congress in 2009 approved the ShoshonePaiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation Water Rights Settlement and a settlement of the
Navajo Nation's rights to the San Juan River Basin in New Mexico. Omnibus Public Land
Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, §§ 10301-704, 123 Stat. 991, 1367-405 (Navajo
Nation); §§ 10801-09, 123 Stat. at 1405-14 (Shoshone-Paiute Tribes). Legislation introduced in
the first session of the Illth Congress would settle claims of the White Mountain Apache Tribe,
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ratification. 12 1 In addition, there are approximately twenty-five tribes currently
involved in eighteen settlement negotiations,1 22 all of which are the result of
litigation.
Given the paucity of both Supreme Court precedent and general
congressional legislation on the issues, the question arises as to the precedential
value of these settlements. The first modem settlement, Ak Chin, contained no
disclaimer at all.12 3 The Fort McDowell Indian Community Water Rights
Settlement Act of 1990 has a simple disclaimer apparently designed to protect
similarly situated tribes from any unintended legal effects: "Nothing in the
Agreement or this title shall be construed in any way to quantify or otherwise
adversely affect the land and water rights, claims or entitlements to water of
any Arizona Indian tribe, band or community, other than the Community."l 24
On the other hand, most of the recent settlements contain disclaimers
purporting to limit any precedential effect. For example, the Soboba Band of
Luisefio Indians Settlement Act provides:
(d) PRECEDENT.-Nothing in this Act establishes any standard for the
quantification or litigation of Federal reserved water rights or any other
Indian water claims of any other Indian tribes in any other judicial or
administrative proceeding.
(e) OTHER INDIAN TRIBES.-Nothing in the Settlement Agreement or
this Act shall be construed in any way to quantify or otherwise
S. 313; Crow Tribe, S. 375; Taos Pueblo, S. 965; and Pueblos of Nambe, Pojoaque, San Ildefonso
& Tesuque, S. 1105. See Appendix for a state-by-state list of settlements.
121. These are the Fort Peck Compact and a settlement at Warm Springs. COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 25,

§

19.05[2], at 1212 n.327. The Warm

Springs agreement was subsequently incorporated into a state court decree. In re The
Determination of Relative Rights to the Use of the Waters of the Deschutes River and Its
Tributaries, No. 99CCV0380ST (Cir. Ct. Deschutes Co. Jan. 7, 2003). Litigation over
groundwater on the Lummi Indian Reservation in Washington was settled with a consent decree
entered with the court. United States ex rel. Lummi Indian Nation v. Washington, No. CO 1-0047Z,
2007 WL 4190400 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2007) (groundwater on Lummi Indian reservation),
aff'd, 328 Fed. App'x. 462 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished decision approving consent decree).
122. The negotiation figure is derived from the list of "Federal Water Rights Negotiation
Teams for Indian Water Rights Settlements" (Sept. 21, 2009) kept by the Secretary of the
Interior's Indian Water Rights Office. The tribes involved in negotiations are Pueblos ofNambe,
Pojoaque, San Ildefonso, Tesuque, Jemez, Zia, Acoma, Laguna, Taos, Santa Ana & Zuni,
Blackfeet Tribe, Crow Tribe, Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, Gros Ventre & Assiniboine
Tribes, Hopi Tribe, San Juan Southern Paiute Tribe, Navajo Nation, Lummi Nation, Soboba Band
of Luiseno Indians, Tule River Indian Tribe, San Carlos Apache Tribe, Walker River Paiute
Indian Tribe, Bridgeport Indian Colony, Yerington Paiute Tribe, and White Mountain Apache
Tribe. See Thorson, Dividing Western Waters, supra note 83, at 449-58. A useful table setting
forth the status of all western state general stream adjudications can be found in Thorson, Dividing
Western Waters, Part II, supra note 83, at 439-42.

123. See Act of July 28, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-328, 92 Stat. 409 (1978) (settling water
rights claims of the Ak-Chin Indian community against the United States). The Jicarilla Apache
Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-441, 106 Stat. 2237 (1992), also does not
contain a disclaimer.
124. Pub. L. No. 101-628, § 413, 104 Stat. 4469, 4480,4492 (1990).
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adversely affect the water rights, claims, or entitlements to water of
any Indian tribe, band, or community, other than the Soboba Tribe. 125
In similar fashion, the Snake River Water Rights Act of 2004 provides,
"Nothing in this Act-(A) establishes any standard for the quantification of
Federal reserved water rights or any other Indian water claims of any other
Indian tribes in any other judicial or administrative proceeding...."' 26
Likewise, the recent act codifying the San Juan River Basin settlement between
the Navajo Nation, New Mexico, and the United States provides:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), nothing in the Agreement, the
Contract, or this section quantifies or adversely affects the land and
water rights, or claims or entitlements to water, of any Indian tribe or
community other than the rights, claims, or entitlements of the Nation
in, to, and from the San Juan River Basin in the State of New

Mexico.

127

Parallel to the disclaimers are Congress's findings in the various
settlements. In the Shoshone-Paiute Settlement, Congress found that
"quantifying rights to water and development of facilities needed to use tribal
water supplies is essential to the development of viable Indian reservation
economies and the establishment of a permanent reservation homeland."1 2 8 The
Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement contains a finding that
Congress supports the settlement to further the "goals of Federal Indian policy
and to fulfill the trust responsibility of the United States to the Tribe . . . so as
to enable the Tribe to utilize fully its water entitlements in developing a
diverse, efficient reservation economy."l 29 The Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake
Water Rights Settlement provides authority for acquisition of water for
fisheries and habitat protectionl 30 despite the adverse ruling to the United States
and Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe in Nevada v. United States.131 Indeed, even in
situations in which all the details of a settlement have not yet been reached,
Congress has also acted to encourage a final agreement.' 32
125. Pub. L. No. 110-297, §9, 122 Stat. 2965, 2981-83 (2008).
126. Pub. L. No. 108-447, tit. X, § 11, 118 Stat. 2809, 3431, 3440 (2004).
127. Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, § 10701(f)(1),
123 Stat. 991, 1401; see also San Juan River Basin in New Mexico: Navajo Nation Water Rights
Settlement Agreement (Apr. 19, 2005), availableat http://www.ose.state.nm.us/water-info/Navajo
Settlement/NavajoSettlement.pdf.
128. Omnibus Public Land Management Act § 10801(2). The Act contains a disclaimer of
application to other situations similar to that in the Soboba Settlement quoted above. See id. §
10809(b).
129. Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103434, § 102(a)(9), 108 Stat. 4526, 4527.
130. Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-618, §
201, 104 Stat. 3289, 3294 (1990).
131. 463 U.S. 110 (1983); see supra text accompanying note 80.
132. Congress has been flexible in approving settlements of various types. In the San Luis
Rey Indian Water Rights Settlement Act, for example, Congress provided for a settlement of a
long-running piece of litigation even though the parties had only reached an agreement in
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As much as, if not more than, in any other area, negotiations of Indian
water rights are conducted "from the ground up,"' 33 meaning that all parties to
litigation and negotiations quite naturally look to what has been done before,
regardless of disclaimer language in prior legislated settlements. This is exactly
how it should be. As demonstrated above, there is not a great deal of settled law
from the Supreme Court surrounding many of the important issues that arise in
Indian water rights litigation. There is, however, a good deal of guidance, albeit
not completely consistent, from the lower courts.1 34 When parties leave it to the
courts to decide these critical issues, they take a tremendous risk, which
sometimes results in even more ambiguity, as with the Arizona Supreme
Court's 2001 ruling in Gila River. 135 Thus, understanding federal Indian law in
the water rights context requires a thorough comprehension of the few Supreme
Court cases dealing with the merits, solid trends in lower court decisions,1 3 6 and
principle. Pub. L. No. 100-675, § 103(a)(1),(6), 102 Stat. 4000, 4000-01 (1988) (affecting "the La
Jolla, Rincon, San Pasqual, Pauma and Pala Bands of Mission Indians"). Although the agreement
was not yet final, the congressional action was a key demonstration of support and encouragement
toward the final settlement.
133. See Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New
Realism in FederalIndian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649, 651 (2006). Frickey states:

If, as legal realism suggests, the law that counts is the law in action, and the law in
action should be measured by a bottom-up consequential calculus rather than some topdown consistency with abstract doctrine, the legal community cannot hope to
understand, much less appreciate, federal Indian law without a much better sense of
grounded reality.
Id.

134. The chief difference relates to the inquiry into the determination of the purposes of a
reservation. However, even that difference is relatively narrow since it arises from two state
supreme courts-Arizona and Wyoming-and the Arizona approach has never been applied to a
concrete fact situation. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 25, §
19.03[4], at 1183 ("The approach of the majority of courts is more consistent with the Indian law
canons of construction that call for the documents creating an Indian reservation to be construed
liberally in favor of the Indians.").
135. See supra text accompanying notes 113-117.
136. In the category of solid trends, I place recognition of tribal instream flows for
protection of fisheries habitat. Thus, in Colville ConfederatedTribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th

Cir. 1981), the court supplemented its award of water under the PIA standard with water for
instream flows to support tribal fisheries. The Ninth Circuit reached the same outcome in United
States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (1984). In the same vein, the Washington Supreme Court
recognized that tribes with treaty language or history reflecting a reservation of aboriginal rights
to fish also have water rights for instream flow habitat protection. State Dep't of Ecology v.
Yakima Reservation Irrigation Dist., 850 P.2d 1306, 1317 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) ("Water to
fulfill the fishing rights under the treaty may be found to have been reserved, if fishing was a
primary purpose of the reservation."); see also Joint Bd. of Control of Flathead Irrigation Dist. v.
United States, 832 F.2d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1, 5
(E.D. Wash. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984) (water reserved to
maintain favorable temperature conditions to support fishery); Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v.
Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1985) (court acted appropriately in
ordering release of water to protect habitat for treaty fishery); State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 764-66 (Mont. 1985) (tribal
reserved rights may include water for fisheries as well as agriculture and other purposes). On the
other hand, a state district court in Idaho rejected Indian reserved rights for instream flows. In re
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most importantly, the past congressional approaches. While federal
Administrations of both political parties have complained about the cost of
Indian water rights settlements, many of the intractable problems faced in the
arid West today are the result of a more than a century of federal neglect of
tribal water needs and a corresponding encouragement of non-Indian
development.137 As a consequence, the tribes and other parties to litigation look
to the United States to help settle conflicts that, in the view of the non-federal
parties, the federal government did the most to create in the first instance. The
bulk of the harm from the federal government's action (and inaction) most
often was inflicted on the tribes, while non-Indian irrigation projects and state
law appropriators have only recently begun to feel pressure as a result of the
assertion of federal reserved rights, climate change, drought, and other
environmental laws such as the Endangered Species Act.
At least on paper, the federal government's participation in Indian water
settlements negotiations is guided by formal criteria and procedures for Indian
water settlements that were established in 1991.1 Non-federal parties
generally regard these as unhelpful tools in promoting settlements, except to the
extent they express a general federal policy promoting settlement of Indian
water right claims. Like formal scholarly approaches to Indian water rights that
foundationalists or critics might advocate, the guidelines provide a jumping off
point for the exploration of settlement alternatives among motivated parties. As
noted elsewhere, the criteria do not appear to have played any substantive role
in the comprehensive settlement of the Snake River Basin Adjudication, 1 but
in testimony in 2008 on the Navajo-San Juan Settlement, the Bush
Administration relied heavily on the criteria in its formal opposition to the
Settlement: "The Administration did not participate in the drafting of the water
rights settlement embodied in S. 1171, and does not support a water settlement
under these circumstances. For these reasons, the Administration opposes the
cost and cannot support the legislation as written."l 40 Lawmakers reintroduced
the Settlement in the 111th Congress and it became law early in the Obama
SRBA, Case No. 39576, Consolidated Subcase No. 03-10022 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Nov. 10, 1999).
Congress mooted the controversy by approving an Indian water rights settlement, the Snake River
Basin Adjudication, which provided for instream flow protection. Snake River Water Rights Act
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, tit. X, § 11, 118 Stat. 2809, 3431.
137.

See NAT'L WATER CoMM'N, supra note 40; Anderson, supra note 40.

138. Criteria and Procedures for the Participation of the Federal Government in the
Negotiations for the Settlement of Indian Water Rights, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (March 12, 1990).
139. See Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights: Litigation and Settlements, 42 TULSA
L. REV. 23, 33-35 (2006).
140. S. REP. No. 110-401, 2d Sess., at 35 (2008). The Bush Administration's statement at
least gave lip-service to flexibility, but the position appeared to be primarily cost driven. Id. at 37
("The Administration believes that the policy guidance found in the Criteria and Procedures . . .
provides a flexible framework in which we can evaluate the merits of this bill. . . . As we have
testified previously, the Criteria is [sic] a tool that allows the Administration to evaluate each
settlement in its unique context while also establishing a process that provides guidance upon
which proponents of settlements can rely.").
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Administration.141 It is not clear whether the new Administration will rely on
the guidelines as a ready source of opposition to pending settlements on fiscal
grounds, but preliminary indications in testimony regarding the proposed
Aamodt Litigation Settlement Act are promising.14 2 The Aamodt Settlement
Act, along with two other Indian water rights settlements, passed the House of
Representatives with apparent Administration support as H.R. 3342 on Jan. 21,
20 10.143 In a letter to Senate Indian Affairs Committee Chairman Byron
Dorgan, Commissioner of Reclamation Michael Connor stated that the Obama
Administration "would like to work with Congress to identify and implement
clear criteria for going forward with future settlements on issues including costsharing and eligible costs."'" The willingness of the Administration to discuss
the core elements of the Criteria and Procedures with Congress (and
presumably the tribes and other constituents) is a welcome sign of flexibility
and indicates great potential for resolution of other difficult water rights
disputes. It is certainly a major improvement over the Bush Administration's
practice of sometimes sitting on the sidelines with no official input, and then
simply appearing at Committee hearings to voice last-minute opposition as
dictated by the Office of Management and Budget.
Another encouraging development is the establishment of the Reclamation
Water Settlement Fundl 45 to fund Indian water rights settlements without either
decimating the budget of the Bureau of Indian Affairs or completely reordering
the Bureau of Reclamation's operations. While the Fund is not scheduled to
provide a funding stream until 2020, its creation is a significant step in the right
direction, and the current Administration is reliably rumored to favor advancing
the timing of its availability. Access to this fund is a response to years of efforts
by Indian and non-Indian advocates to encourage increased federal support for
Indian water settlements. 146
The momentum in favor of settlements owes a great deal to federal
executive branch policy, congressional action, and the realization that lengthy
141. Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, § 10701, 123
Stat. 991, 1396.
142. See S. REP. No. 111-115, 2d Sess., at 12 (2010) (statement of Michal Connor,
Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, regarding S. 1105). This proposed settlement involves the
Pueblos of Nambe, Pojoaque, San Ildefonso, and Tesuque in New Mexico.
143. H.R. 3342, 111th Cong. (as passed by House, Jan. 21, 2010); see H. Rep. No. 111399, 2d Sess. (2010) (reporting the Taos, Aamodt, and White Mountain Apache Settlements for
passage by the House). For committee reports on the Aamodt settlement, see H. Rep. 111-390, 2d
Sess., at 28-29 (2010), and S. Rep. 111-115, 2d Sess. (2010); for the Taos reports, see S. Rep.
111-117, 2d Sess. (2010), and H. Rep. 111-395, 2d Sess. (2010); and for the White Mountain
Apache Tribe Settlement, see S. Rep. 111-119, 2d Sess. (2010), and H. Rep. 111-391, 2d Sess.
(2010).
144. S. Rep. I11-115,2dSess.,at 15(2010).
145. Omnibus Public Land Management Act § 10501.
146. These efforts have been led by the Native American Rights Fund and the Western
States Water Council. See Western States Water Council - Celebrating Our 40th Anniversary, at
21-22 (2005), availableat http://www.westgov.org/wswc/ca-westernstates.pdf.
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state court litigation under the McCarran Amendment is not a panacea to water
rights disputes. 147 Perhaps more important is an understanding that the history
of Indian water settlements is generally a successful one. To be sure, there are
cases where full funding has taken longer than expected, and Congress may
need to occasionally revisit some of the settlements. That should not, however,
hinder the use of settlements in the future. The problems of water use and
supply are ongoing, and the need for innovative solutions will only increase as
climate change alters the hydrograph of the arid West. Many scholars, in
documenting the specifics of Indian water settlements, have suggested
approaches for the complex and multi-disciplinary effort to find such
solutions.148
CONCLUSION
For years, federal courts, scholars, tribes, and the federal government have
interpreted the "purposes" of Indian reservations in a generous manner in the
water rights context. 149 This broad interpretive approach is what Professor
Frickey calls "purposivism, which implements actual or presumed publiclegislature.",1 50
policy purposes attributed to a rational, public-spirited
147. The State of Washington's so-called Acquavella litigation is ongoing in 2010-thirtyfour years after its commencement in 1975-and is only an adjudication of surface water; ground
water may be next. See Dep't of Ecology v. Acquavella, 935 P.2d 595 (Wash. 1997). The last
order entered by the trial court was a default judgment against a number of parties who were
named as defendants and served, but never appeared in the action. Dep't of Ecology v.
Acquavella, Order of Default and Entry of Default Judgment (Yakima County Super. Court No.
77-2-01484-5) (Dec. 10, 2009). Some might consider Idaho's Snake River Basin Adjudication
fast-track litigation since the Nez Perce tribal claims took only twenty years of litigation before a
settlement was reached. For Idaho Law Review's collection of articles regarding the Snake River
Basin Adjudication and the Nez Perce Water Rights Settlement, see generally 42 IDAHO L. REV.
547-793 (2006).
148. See Nez Perce Water Rights Settlement Articles, supra note 147; JOHN E. THORSON ET
AL., TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY LAW, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS (2006);
BONNIE G. COLBY ET AL., NEGOTIATING TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS: FULFILLING PROMISES IN THE
ARID WEST (2005); DANIEL W.

McCOOL, NATIVE WATERS: CONTEMPORARY INDIAN WATER

SETTLEMENTS AND THE SECOND TREATY ERA (2002); Reid Peyton Chambers & John E.

Echohawk, Implementing the Winters Doctrine of Indian Reserved Water Rights: Producing
Indian Water and Economic Development Without Injuring Non-Indian Water Users?, 27 GONZ.
L. REV. 447 (1991-92); Working Group in Indian Water Settlements; CriteriaandProceduresfor
the Participationof the Federal Government in the Negotiationsfor the Settlement of Indian
Water Rights Claims, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (Mar. 12, 1990); Barbara A. Cosens, The 1997 Water
Rights Settlement Between the State ofMontana and the Chippewa Cree Tribe ofthe Rocky Boy's
Reservation: The Role of Community and of the Trustee, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 255,

257 (1998). All of the Montana Tribal-State Compacts are collected in a publication of the
Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, MONTANA WATER COMPACTS (2008).

149. The Supreme Court recently reiterated the principle that when interpreting treaties
courts must "look beyond the written words to the larger context that frames the Treaty, including
'the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties."'
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 (1999) (quoting Choctaw
Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943)).
150.

Frickey, MarshallingPast and Present,supra note 43, at 406-07 n. 112.
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Congressional action ratifying Indian water settlements is consistent with this
approach. Such action reflects the reality that while litigation may be necessary
to frame issues and provide a framework within which settlement discussions
may occur, the negotiation process achieves better outcomes. As Professor
Frickey notes:
In the last analysis, negotiation seems to promise to bring Indians into
Indian law far better than does adjudication. Negotiation turns not on
incoherent or misunderstood legal doctrines, but on practical realities.
Negotiation gives people .. . a piece of the legal action and a chance to
own, if only partially, both the resolution of particular disputes and a
greater sense of the structure and efficacy of the long-term
relationships between the parties.m
Anyone involved in the litigation, settlement, or study of Indian water rights
can see the wisdom in Professor Frickey's words. Critical to achieving success
in the settlement of these controversies is a practical approach premised on the
secure foundation of the reserved rights doctrine, coupled with an eye on the
history of each situation and the helpful participation of the United States.
Federal participation must not only include zealous legal representation of
tribal interests as trustee in litigation, but also a willingness to assist resolution
of discrete controversies with creative approaches and financial support.
Practical reasoning in the Indian water rights context requires general
acknowledgement of the validity of Indian reserved rights claims. The United
States should support settlements that tribal and non-federal parties achieve as a
mechanism to give meaning to treaty promises unfulfilled for too many years,
and to avoid unproductive and contentious litigation.

151.

Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in

Federal Indian Law, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1754, 1783 (1996) (citations omitted).
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APPENDIX: INDIAN WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENTS*

Arizona

Arizona Water Settlements Act (Gila River, Tohono O'odham, San
Carlos), Pub. L. No. 108-451, 118 Stat. 3478 (2004).
Zuni Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 2003 (Zuni Heaven),
Pub. L. No. 108-34, 117 Stat. 782.
Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. 103-434, tit. I, 108 Stat. 4526, amended by Pub. L. No. 104-91, § 201, 110
Stat. 7 (1996).
San Carlos Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-575, tit. XXXVII, 106 Stat. 4600, 4740, amended by Pub. L. No. 103435, § 13, 108 Stat. 4566, 4572 (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-91, § 202,
110 Stat. 7, 14 (1996), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-261, § 3, 100 Stat. 3176,
181
158,
3176 (1996), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-18, § 5003, 111 Stat.
(1997).
Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act of 1982 (Tohono
O'odham), Pub. L. No. 97-293, tit. III, 96 Stat. 1261, 1274, amended by
Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Technical Amendments Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-497, § 8, 106 Stat. 3255, 3256, amended by Arizona
Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-451, 118 Stat. 3478 (2004).
Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Water Rights Settlement
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-512, 102 Stat. 2549, amended by Technical
Amendments to Various Indian Laws Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-238, § 7,
105 Stat. 1908, 1910.
Fort McDowell Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-628, tit. IV, 104 Stat. 4469, 4480.
Act of July 28, 1978 (Ak-Chin), Pub. L. No. 95-328, 92 Stat. 409,
amended by Pub. L. No. 98-530, 98 Stat. 2698 (1984), amended by Ak-Chin
Water Use Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-497, § 10, 106 Stat.
3255, 3258, amended by Ak-Chin Water Use Amendments Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-285, 114 Stat. 878.
California

San Luis Rey Indian Water Rights Settlement Act (La Jolla, Rincon, San
Pasquale, Pauma, and Pala Bands of Mission Indians), Pub. L. No. 100-675, tit.
I, 102 Stat. 4000 (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-154, 105 Stat. 990
(1991), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-256, § 11, 112 Stat. 1896, 1899 (1998),
amended by Pub. L.106-377, § 211, 114 Stat. 1441 (2000).
* This list was compiled by and reproduced courtesy of Jeanne Whiteing, Law Offices of
Whiteing and Smith, Boulder, Colo.
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Soboba Band of Luisefio Indians Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 110-297,
122 Stat. 2975 (2008).
Colorado

Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988 (Southern Ute
and Ute Mountain Ute), Pub. L. No. 100-585, 102 Stat. 2973, amended by Pub.
L. No. 104-46, tit. V, § 507, 109 Stat. 402, 419 (1995), amended by Pub. L. No.
106-554, tit. III, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
Florida

Seminole Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100228, § 7, 101 Stat. 1556, 1560 (1987).
Idaho

Snake River Water Rights Act of 2004 (Nez Perce Tribe), Pub. L. No.
108-447, tit. X, 118 Stat. 2809, 3431.
Fort Hall Indian Water Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-602, 104 Stat.
3059.
Montana

Chippewa Cree Tribe of The Rocky Boy's Reservation Indian Reserved
Water Rights Settlement and Water Supply Enhancement Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-163, 113 Stat. 1778.
Northern Cheyenne Indian Reserved Water Rights Settlement Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-374, 106 Stat. 1186, amended by Pub. L. No. 103-263, §
1(a), 108 Stat. 707, 707 (1992).
Fort Peck-Montana Compact (Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort
Peck Reservation), Mont. Code Ann. § 85-20-201 (1985).
Nevada

Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No.
101-618, tit. II, 104 Stat. 3289, 3294 (1990).
Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-618, tit. I, 104 Stat. 3289, 3289, amended by Native
American Technical Corrections Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-221, § 104, 120
Stat. 336.
Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation Water Rights
Settlement Act, Pub. L. 111-11, tit. X, §§ 10801-09, 123 Stat. 1405, 1405-14
(2009).
New Mexico

Jicarilla Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-441,
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106 Stat. 2237 (1992), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-261, § 2, 110 Stat. 3176,
3176 (1996), as amended, Pub. L. No. 105-256, § 10, 112 Stat. 1896 (1998).
Northwestern New Mexico Rural Water Projects Act (Navajo San Juan
Settlement), Pub. L. 111-11, tit. X, §§ 10301-05, 123 Stat. 1367-71 (2009).
Oregon

Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation Water Rights
Settlement Agreement (1997)), entered as consent decree in In the Matter of the
Determination of Relative Rights to the Use of the Waters of the Deschutes
River and Its Tributaries, No. 99CCV0380ST (Cir. Ct. Deschutes Co. Jan. 7,
2003).
Utah

Shivwits Band of the Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah Water Rights Settlement
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-263, 114 Stat. 737 (2000).
Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992 (Ute),
Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. V, 106 Stat. 4600, 4650.
Washington

United States ex rel. Lummi Indian Nation v. Washington, No. C010047Z, 2007 WL 4190400 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2007) (order approving
consent decree governing groundwater on Lummi Indian reservation), aff'd,
328 Fed. App'x 462 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished decision).
Pending Settlements-- 11th Congress

Aamodt Litigation Settlement Act, S. 1105 (introduced May 20, 2009)
(Pueblos of Nambe, Pojoaque San Ildefonso and Tesuque), Passed House of
Representatives, H.R. 3342 (Jan. 20, 2010).
Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 2009, S. 375 (introduced Feb.
4, 2009).
Taos Pueblo Indian Water Right Settlement Act, S. 965 (introduced May
4, 2009), Passed House of Representatives, H.R. 3254 (Jan. 20, 2010).
White Mountain Apache Tribe Water Rights Quantification Act of 2009,
S. 313 (introduced Jan. 26, 2009), Passed House of Representatives, H.R. 1065
(Jan. 20, 2010).
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